# Preparing for Foreign Visitors

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# Introduction



International visitors are common in today's global economy and are often a welcome opportunity to boost business. However, cleared contractors need to be aware that there are potential Counter Intelligence (CI) vulnerabilities.

While most visitors are here for legitimate purposes, the sheer volume of visitors makes it difficult to detect those with ulterior motives.

Foreign delegation visits to cleared contractor facilities is one of the most frequently used methods to target and attempt to gain access to sensitive and classified information resident in cleared industry.



# Research and Development

It is cheaper for foreign entities to illicitly obtain sensitive or classified information and technology than it is to fund the initial research and development (R&D) themselves.

The U.S. government spends more on R&D than any other country in the world, making the U.S. contractors performing R&D a prime target for foreign collection of both classified and unclassified commercial technology.

When a foreign visit occurs at your facility, preparation and awareness is essential to preventing a loss of information. Stay alert and watch for indicators to help assess the potential for visitor targeting or collection.



# Techniques Visitors Use to Elicit Information



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| **Peppering** | Visitors ask a variation of the same question or one visitor asks the same question to multiple U.S. contractor employees. |
| **Wandering Visitor** | The visitor uses the distraction provided by a large delegation to slip away, out of the control o the escort. Once away from the escort, the visitor may attempt to gain access to a restricted area, sensitive or classified documents, or unattended and unlocked information systems. |
| **Divide & Conquer** | Visitors corner an escort away from the group and attempt to discuss unapproved topics in order to deprive the escort of his safety net of assistance in answering questions. |
| **Switch Visitors** | Delegations may add a new visitor to the group at the last minute, leaving little or no time for the company to vet the new visitor against known intelligence officers. |
| **Bait & Switch** | The visitors say they are coming to discuss one business topic but after they arrive they attempt to discuss the cleared contractor's other projects, often dealing with sensitive or classified information. |
| **Distraught Visitor** | When the visitor's questions are not answered, he/she acts insulted or creates an uncomfortable scene to psychologically coerce information from the target. |
| **Use of Prohibited Electronics** | The visitors bring unauthorized electronic devices such as cell phones, cameras, or thumb drives into restricted space. |

# Preparing for Foreign Visitors



- ★ Prior to the visit, provide a copy of the foreign visitor's passport and identification to the Facility Security Officer (FSO). Allow at least ten (10) days before the visit in order to provide the documentation to the U.S. government.
- ★ An escort briefing is provided to all personnel who will be escorting the delegation. The briefing trains escorts on detecting suspicious behavior and questions; ensuring they know to maintain visual contact with all visitors at all times.
- ★ At the time of the visit, a briefing is provided to the delegation along with the acknowledgement of a non-disclosure statement.
- ★ If the delegation attempts to make additional contacts with escorts and speakers, make sure they keep discussions to the agreed-upon topics and information.
- ★ After the visit, if any strange and/or suspicious activities were exhibited by the visitors or unusual probing questions, escorts are required to report to the Security Office as soon as possible.



# The Take Away

Any line of questioning concerning military or intelligence-based contracts or dual-use technology, unless previously approved, should be viewed as suspicious behavior.

Even if an appropriate authority grants a foreign visitor access to classified U.S. information, that visitor is not entitled to classified information unless he/she has a clearance, need to know that has been communicated and verified in advance of the visit.

Inform the FSO of all proposed foreign visitors. Given adequate time, Defense Counterintelligence Security Agency can assist with identifying risks to the cleared company, its technology, and its personnel.





**If any suspicious incidents occur during the visit, report them to your FSO**

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